

Message Text

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SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL VISIT BACKGROUND PAPER X: JAPAN'S RELATIONSHIPS
WITH INDOCHINA

1. JAPAN MAINTAINS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENTS
OF LAOS, THE KHMER REPUBLIC (GKR), AND BOTH SOUTH AND NORTH
VIETNAM. JAPAN IS SECOND ONLY TO THE UNITED STATES IN
PROVIDING ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO LAOS, KHMER AND SOUTH
VIETNAM.

2. THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT GIVE ANY OFFICIAL
RECOGNITION TO THE INSURGENT FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND
CAMBODIA, THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT (PRG
OR VIET CONG) AND PRINCE SIHANOUK'S GRUNK, RESPECTIVELY,
THE GOJ, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN UNDER PRESSURE FROM NORTH
VIETNAM TO TAKE A MORE FORTHCOMING STAND TOWARD THE PRG.
INITIALLY, HANOI ATTEMPTED TO GET JAPAN TO "RECOGNIZE"
THE PRG AS A CONDITION FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC
TIES WITH NORTH VIETNAM. JAPAN REFUSED. HANOI FINALLY
AGREED TO DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION IN SEPTEMBER 1973 BUT
CONTINUED TO INSIST THAT JAPAN A) MAKE A "GESTURE" TOWARD
THE PRG, AND B) PAY REPARATIONS FOR WORLD WAR II OCCUPATION,
AS CONDITIONS FOR OPENING OF EMBASSIES IN HANOI AND TOKYO.
THE GOJ ALSO SUCCESSFULLY RESISTED THESE DEMANDS.

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3. POSSIBLY REFLECTING ITS INCREASING ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES,

HANOI THIS SUMMER ABANDONED, AT LEAST FOR TIME BEING, ITS EFFORTS TO OBTAIN JAPANESE OFFICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE PRG. JAPAN HAS AGREED TO MAKE AN INITIAL AID GRANT OF 5 BILLION YEN (\$16 MILLION) WITH A FINAL FIGURE (INCLUDING THE INITIAL 5 BILLION) OF BETWEEN TWELVE AND FIFTEEN BILLION YEN TO BE SUBJECT OF FURTHER DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS. THIS GRANT WILL BE MADE IN LIEU OF REPARATIONS. JAPAN WILL OPEN AN EMBASSY IN HANOI PROBABLY BEFORE THE END OF 1974. THE DRV WILL PROBABLY SET UP ITS EMBASSY IN TOKYO SOMETIME NEXT YEAR.

4. IN AN EFFORT TO ACCOMMODATE, AT LEAST PARTIALLY, THE OBJECTIONS OF BOTH HANOI AND THE JAPANESE OPPOSITION PARTIES TO THE GOJ'S OFFICIAL RECOGNITION AND SUPPORT FOR THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTS OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND KHMER, THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT MAINTAIN AN ATTITUDE OF TOTAL HOSTILITY TO THE PRG AND GRUNK. JAPAN MAKES A DISTINCTION BETWEEN "NON-GOVERNMENTS" LIKE THE PRG AND GRUNK AND PERSONS FROM SUCH AREAS, WHO MAY WISH TO ENTER JAPAN FORREASONS OF TRADE, SPORTS, CULTURAL EXCHANGE, ETC. SUCH PERSONS HAVE BEEN TREATED WITH SYMPATHY AND "FLEXIBILITY".

5. AIDED BY THE ASEAN COUNTRIES, THE JAPANESE LED THE FIGHT IN 1973 AGAINST AN ATTEMPT TO OUST THE GKR FROM THE UNITED NATIONS. THE JAPANESE ARE AGAIN THIS YEAR PLAYING AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE UN IN SUPPORT OF THE GKR. LIKE ALL GKR SUPPORTERS, THEY ARE BEARISH ABOUT THE PHNOM PENH'S PROSPECTS IN UNGA THIS YEAR BUT ARE WORKING ACTIVELY WITH OTHER ASIAN GOVERNMENTS TO DEVELOP A NEW STRATEGY THAT WILL BUY MORE TIME FOR THE KHMER. THE GOJ'S CONCERN IS THAT A GKR OUSTER FROM THE UN WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT IN THE LONG RUN TO JUSTIFY CONTINUED GOJ ECONOMIC AID TO THEKHMER GOVERNMENT.

6. JAPAN ENTHUSIASTICALLY SUPPORTS THE COALITION SETTLEMENT OF THE LAOTIAN PROBLEM AND PLANS TO MAINTAIN ITS ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR LAOS. (SEE BACKGROUND PAPER ON AID).

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7. DURING THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO EXPRESS APPRECIATION FOR JAPAN'S CONSTRUCTIVE, IMAGINATIVE, AND ENERGETIC ROLE IN ATTEMPTING TO PRESERVE THE GOVERNMENT OF KHMER'S POSITION IN THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE SHOULD EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME OF THE UNGA VOTE, JAPAN WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE KHMER

GOVERNMENT AND TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. MORE
GENERALLY, IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO EXPRESS OUR APPROVAL
OF JAPAN'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT FOR THE GVN, AS
WELL AS THEIR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO LAOS.
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